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1. Introduction  
We appreciate the response by Erik Haites (2020) to our paper (van den Bergh et al, 2020), not 
only as it is well-informed and contains many subtle remarks, but also as our article was aimed at 
stimulating debate on how to achieve effective climate policies that limit global warming change 
to 1.5-2°C. There is no question that the latter represents a tremendous challenge for the global 
community, and our dual-track proposal is intended to provide a workable approach to it by 
addressing the free-riding problem through policy harmonization. Although we feel that Haites 
raises many relevant points regarding the difficulties of carrying out the proposal, our reading is 
that most of these were, in fact, already addressed by our paper. Unfortunately, he does not 
recognize the proposal’s strengths, nor does he offer a credible alternative, while in particular 
disregarding or downplaying the second track of redirecting UN negotiations to carbon pricing, 
which is key to the overall feasibility of the proposal. More generally, Haites considers the end 
goal too much as a static policy design issue while giving little credit to the gradual, multi-stage 
transition nature of our proposal, which we argued to raise political feasibility. 
In addition, Haites’ rejection of our proposal implies that either (1) a superior 
(unidentified) mechanism exists or will be developed to achieve global policy harmonization; or 
(2) countries will unilaterally and voluntarily implement sufficiently strong climate policies to 
rapidly reduce carbon emissions, that is, without policy harmonization. The latter is essentially 
the approach of the Paris Agreement. Past experience has shown that this is extremely unlikely to 
yield the desired outcomes, given that climate solutions are hampered by free-riding between 
countries (Barrett, 2018). Our starting point, based on these prior works, was that political leaders 
need to work on overcoming the free-riding problem by harmonizing policies. Only afterwards 
can they take the next step of strengthening policies gradually. We explained that carbon pricing 
is by far the best approach to operationalize the global harmonization of policy, implemented with 
either carbon taxes, trading markets (cap-and-trade), or a combination. We are open to arguments 
that identify other instruments with which policy harmonization and stringency can be realized. 
Note that such an alternative plan should not only clarify instrument effectiveness and efficiency, 
but also in what way it controls rebound and leakage, and how it fares in terms of political 
feasibility. In the absence of an alternative proposal, we therefore disagree with either possible 
implication of Haites’ rejection. 
We do not claim that our approach will be easy to achieve. In fact, we do not perceive 
any easy approach to achieve climate policies worldwide on the scale that is urgently required, 
and continue to believe that the two-track proposal is stronger than the alternatives. So, if Haites 
says “The concept is conceptually elegant but, I believe, doomed to fail in practice.” we are 
inclined to respond: then keeping global warming below 2°C may be doomed to fail. Below we 
respond to the specific concerns of Haites. 
 
2. Complexity of domestic mitigation policy  
We agree with Haites that the diversity of current domestic policy mixes complicates matters, not 
just for global carbon pricing but for any harmonized and hence stringent global policy. However, 
one should not take current policy mixes as permanent. They are far from optimal and will 
inevitably change over time when it will become clear that they fall short of reaching emission 
targets. Current policy mixes tend to focus overly on “enabling” voluntary emissions reduction 
(terminology from Bulkeley and Kern, 2006) in the form of information provision or adoption 
subsidies, at the expense of regulation of firms and households through strict carbon-emission 
standards or carbon pricing. This holds not only for national policies but also for local policies 
(van den Bergh, 2020). To realize needed emissions reduction, the policy mix has to become less 
complex, focusing more on regulatory effectiveness. This will ensure that the overall policy can 
be more easily assessed and compared among jurisdictions, in turn aiding harmonization and 
strengthening.  
We further agree with Haites that, in an early phase of the dual-track transition, multiple 
interacting policies may cause carbon prices to still vary across jurisdictions, also – as argued in 
our paper – to accommodate differences in per capita GDP. In later phases, though, maximum 
convergence should be strived for. Any policy mixes at this stage should be designed with three 
considerations in mind. First, although there are indeed important positive synergies among 
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certain instruments as stressed by Haites, other instrument combinations overlap or involve 
negative synergies. For example, the latter has been noted to occur between emission standards, 
renewable energy targets or adoption subsidies on the one hand, and carbon markets on the other 
(Fankhauser et al., 2010). Second, each additional policy instrument creates extra transaction 
costs of associated political and policy processes, additional costs of monitoring and control, and 
sometimes serious budgetary sacrifices, such as in the case of innovation and adoption subsidies. 
And third, stringency of complex policy mixes is hard to compare among regions and countries 
(Schmidt and Sewerin, 2019), which in turn may limit their international harmonization (Howlett 
et al., 2017). It is surprising that this latter point is not stressed more in the literature, given the 
global setting of climate policy. 
All in all, our proposal is to design a climate policy with minimal complexity, focused on 
instruments that well complement carbon pricing and possibly even create positive synergies with 
it (van den Bergh et al., 2020b). Looking back, perhaps we did not stress this simplification of 
national policy mixes enough in our paper. We did, though, explicitly mention that carbon pricing 
should replace as much as possible existing fuel and energy taxes, as this will lead to more 
transparency and international comparability, as well as more precise incentives for carbon 
emissions reduction. Of course, other than GHG-related externalities of fuel combustion, notably 
local pollutants, may still warrant additional fuel/energy taxes. 
 
3. Technical challenges raised by an international carbon price  
We welcome the points about linking ETSs to achieve uniform prices. As Haites indicates, such 
linking is fairly simple, as illustrated by experiences in Europe and North-America (Haites 2015). 
To be successful, ETS designs should indeed be similar. This does not seem an insuperable 
barrier, since countries will learn from experiences of other countries, so that convergence of 
designs is likely. As Haites recognizes, common minimum prices may be part of early transition 
phases, but not a final outcome. 
We fully agree that there is limited practical evidence for international tax coordination, 
although corporate tax harmonization has been on the agenda of some jurisdictions (Bettendorf 
et al, 2010). Hence, international negotiations might have more success if focused on carbon 
markets. However, it seems that markets can still count on more resistance from social scientists 
and policy advisors than taxes (see, e.g., Rosenbloom et al., 2020; and a response to it by van den 
Bergh and Botzen, 2020). On the other hand, a carbon tax applied at the source would imply a 
relatively small number of countries or firms involved (Heede, 2014) and thus limit the 
coordination challenge. While we understand Haites’ argument that national taxes are not updated 
frequently, our proposal is to make regular updating part of the coalition, and ultimately global, 
agreement. This would be consistent with the widely accepted gradually rising carbon-price path 
over time (or a cap reduction path).  
 We appreciate the remark that effective and not nominal tax rates are to be coordinated. 
As part of this, it would be good and even necessary for current energy and fuel taxes to be 
replaced by a carbon price, for two reasons: this makes policies more easily comparable between 
countries; and it leads to a more effective incentive for reducing carbon emissions, as current 
energy/fuel taxes are very often designed to achieve other objectives and thus are not aligned with 
carbon content of energy carriers (OECD, 2019). Exchange rates, implementation dates and other 
issues also need to be agreed. 
 We differ on the point that countries’ agreement about annual tax rate increases will 
become exponentially more difficult as the number of countries involved grows. This is true for 
instantaneously negotiating a carbon pricing agreement among countries. But we instead propose 
a gradual transition involving a coalition or club: the initial club will evidently consist of a limited 
number of likeminded members with high ambitions, who are willing to negotiate a carbon pricing 
agreement. As we argued in our paper, any additional members will come on board gradually, 
and face an existing coalition agreement about carbon price harmonization among current 
members which would already specify rules. Moreover, potential new members will feel moral 
pressure as well as a potential reputational effect of the coalition at UNFCCC meetings. It is our 
feeling that Haites considers the end goal too much as a static policy design issue while 




4. Limitation of border carbon adjustment as an incentive to join the club 
We are somewhat surprised by Haites critique on the border carbon adjustment, as we already say 
in Section 2.3 (van den Bergh et al., 2020a): “One might wonder why border carbon tariffs have 
not been tried yet. The simple answer is that countries are understandably fearful of this, and, 
aside from a handful of major players such as the USA, China and the EU, few have the economic 
and political power to do it on their own: a coalition is needed to create a critical mass.” To Haites’ 
remark “It is striking that no jurisdiction has yet implemented a BCA.” the simple response is 
then: no, it is not striking, because only a carbon pricing coalition would be able to do this, and 
such a coalition does not yet exist. Interestingly, the only significant group of countries that could 
be interpreted as a carbon pricing coalition, namely the EU with EU-ETS, has announced its 
intention to implement a border carbon adjustment (as we noted in Section 2.3 of our paper) – 
which supports our argument. 
 Haites makes several good points about emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sources. 
However, we do not see how these comments undercut our proposal. Regarding the comment 
“This is not a very strong incentive to join the club”, our point was not that the decision to join 
the club will be completely based on a simple cost-benefit trade-off. Other factors may play a 
role, such as effects on stakeholders other than exporters, or national benefits of limiting climate 
change. In addition, we stressed that moral pressure, next to economic pressure, plays an 
important role. And again, something ignored by Haites: the second track allows the coalition to 
speak with a powerful voice at UNFCCC meetings, adding to moral pressure. 
 Regarding the initial composition of the carbon pricing coalition, we feel that Haites 
adopts again a rather static view. It is evident that the Unites States is currently not a likely 
candidate. However, if the upcoming elections were to put a new president in office, things might 
look brighter. In our opinion, Haites’ statement that neither China nor the EU are currently ideal 
candidates to participate in an initial coalition comes down to the “glass being half empty”. We 
instead think the “glass is half full”: the fact that both are large players which already have an 
ETS represents an excellent starting point, especially given the favourable experiences with supra-
regional/national integration – as argued in our paper and in Haites (2015). We agree that 
expansion might be slow as implementation of carbon pricing tends to be sluggish, but we do not 
see any fast-track integration alternative for other (effective) instruments. Moreover, by learning 
lessons and adopting proven best practices (as shown by recent ETS programmes, see 
Narassimhan et al. 2018), newcomers might well speed up implementation processes, especially 
if it means joining an existing supra-national carbon pricing scheme, rather than implementing a 
new one on their own. Each time a new member is added, more experience is built up regarding 
implementation and overcoming barriers, from which later members can benefit. Haites also 
stresses that currently not all emissions are covered by EU-ETS. This is true, but no fundamental 
reason why this could not change in the future. Moreover, various EU countries cover other 
emissions through an additional carbon tax. For all these reasons, we are more optimistic than 
Haites. 
 
5. The challenges of implementing the dual-track proposal  
We agree with Haites that the UNFCCC operates by consensus and some parties are opposed to 
market mechanisms. This was exactly the reason for us to include the first track of an expanding 
carbon pricing coalition, which would – as we noted – also be in line with the Paris Agreement. 
Nevertheless, there is obviously a degree of subjectivity in this assessment of how the situation 
would unfold, Haites again seeing the glass as half-empty and we as half-full. We feel this can be 
attributed to his giving less credit to the shift of international relations through the slow, gradual 
and dual-track transition process that we envision. In addition, we feel more weight should be 
given to our argument that negotiating a carbon price – versus technical standards or other 
instruments – implies a simpler and lower-dimension problem and reduces free-riding tendencies. 
Haites makes a good point, though, that the negotiated carbon price should apply to both 
taxes and ETSs. Our view here is that in a transition phase, both instruments would inevitably be 
present. However, over time, convergence to one or the other would be likely and preferable. A 
first step in this direction would be creating a price floor in ETSs. The exact outcome is perhaps 
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difficult to predict, although integration of countries in carbon markets has already been 
successfully achieved, and seems also easier to ensure than with carbon taxes (see Section 3 
above). As long as both instruments persist, harmonization would be easiest by adapting the tax 
at times. This would result in approximate though not perfect harmonization, which is a 
considerable improvement over ‘no harmonization at all’ – as characterizes the current state of 
national climate policies. 
Haites draws on a study for Canada by Rhodes et al. (2017) to state that the “carbon tax 
is the least popular climate mitigation policy, so increasing the tax rate is difficult”. However, the 
same study finds that carbon taxes (and carbon trading) already enjoy majority support. Moreover, 
evidence from British Columbia suggests that the region’s existing carbon tax has even become 
more popular over time, despite several increases of the tax rate (Murray and Rivers, 2015). 
Research has further demonstrated that policy support can be improved through various strategies, 
including labelling of the tax (Kallbekken et al., 2011), trial periods (Cherry et al., 2014) and 
recycling of the carbon-pricing revenues (Klenert et al., 2018), as discussed in Section 3.5 of our 
paper. 
Finally, we are highly surprised that Haites claims that “the dual-track approach does not 
address the fundamental reason underlying the weakness of UNFCCC agreements; the incentive 
for free-riding.” On the contrary, the essence of our approach is limiting and overcoming such 
free-riding. 
 
6. Dual-track transition versus Paris Agreement  
Overall, while appreciating Haites’ comments, we do not regard them as undermining our 
proposal. According to him, “A more effective international mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions is highly desirable. The dual-track proposal is not such a mechanism. Indeed, it might 
be a step backward.” This statement suggests that the Paris Agreement in its current form, i.e. 
without policy coordination, might deliver more, if not sufficient, emissions reduction. This is, 
however, disputed by many, as noted in the four shortcomings and studies mentioned in the 
opening paragraph of our paper. In line with this, despite initial enthusiasm for the Paris 
Agreement one can now observe considerable scepticism about what it will achieve, from the 
media, politicians, NGOs and scientists (Allan, 2019; Greenpeace International, 2019). There is 
thus widespread concern that the Paris Agreement will only achieve weak and inconsistent 
policies that cannot be strengthened sufficiently over time due to the lack of policy harmonization. 
Many scientific studies have shown the shortcomings of the Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), suggesting they are far from sufficient to achieve the Paris emissions target (Höhne et 
al. 2017). It is even difficult to compare what pledges really mean in terms of future emissions – 
i.e. whether they reduce or increase these relative to a common base year. To overcome this lack 
of transparency, economists and scientists have undertaken various studies of the pledges, which 
have served to underscore their inconsistency and insufficiency (Aldy et al. 2016; King and van 
den Bergh, 2019; Liu et al., 2020). 
Haites concludes that we must look for other ways to accelerate mitigation action, 
pointing to the process for strengthening NDCs within the Paris Agreement. However, this 
provides no guarantee for implementation of effective policies. Indeed, a recent assessment finds 
that all countries show a gap between ambition and implementation, except for a few with low 
ambitions (Roelfsema et al., 2020). This is unsurprising, as the Paris Agreement completely relies 
on voluntary emission reductions and is therefore highly prone to the free rider problem. To avoid 
muddling through, our proposal includes policy agreements and pricing incentives, and hence 
reduces reliance on voluntary action. In our view, Haites undervalues the importance of 
international policy harmonization – notably regarding regulatory instruments that are prone to 
free-riding and fears about competitiveness effects. Finally, we would like to stress that the dual-
track transition proposal does not imply dismantling previous commitments in the Paris 
Agreement, but instead represents a way to meet and strengthen these. Indeed, we hope that those 
who are optimistic about the Paris Agreement will, after reading our article and the additional 
arguments presented above, also recognize the value of harmonizing national policies and the 
essential role that carbon pricing can play to achieve this. 
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We remain open to alternative proposals, but for the moment continue to feel that the 
dual-track proposal provides a uniquely workable solution to the tremendous challenge of keeping 
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